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Real cases. What happens today, and what changes with Saksi.

7,833 institutions use Dukcapil population data. In 2025 they looked it up 2.57 billion times. Each lookup opens someone’s NIK, and today that person never hears about it.

UU PDP already asks for the record: Pasal 31 (record all processing), Pasal 32 (the citizen may see it within 3×24 h), Pasal 46 (breach notice within 3×24 h) and Pasal 12 (the right to sue).

The four cases below are scenarios built on these laws and the public evidence listed under Sources.

  1. UU PDP Pasal 32 · Pasal 12Scenario

    Your NIK used by a loan app you never applied to

    Today. A lending app checks your NIK through the Dukcapil gateway. You find out months later, when a debt collector calls.

    Evidence behind this scenario

    With Saksi. A receipt lands at 02:13: “Contoh Lending Co. read your data, credit score check”. You tap Not me, and the regulator gets the report with the sealed record attached.

    Try it as the citizen
  2. UU PDP Pasal 31Scenario

    Your medical record opened by staff who don’t treat you

    Today. The hospital’s access log lives in the hospital’s own system. A curious lookup looks like any other.

    Evidence behind this scenario

    With Saksi. Your receipt names the hospital system, the officer reference and the stated purpose. A purpose that has nothing to do with your care stands out, and nobody can rewrite it later.

    Try it as the agency
  3. UU PDP Pasal 46Scenario

    A breach covered up by deleting the logs

    Today. After a breach, access rows can be edited or deleted. The only copy belongs to the party under suspicion.

    Evidence behind this scenario

    With Saksi. Every access was sealed when it happened. Edit or delete the rows and every affected phone turns red: “Changed after sealing” or “Deleted by the agency”.

    Try it: agency, then the evidence room
  4. UU PDP Pasal 46 · Pasal 31Scenario

    The regulator audits without an on-site inspection

    Today. Supervision means letters and site visits, and the agency UU PDP created has not been formed yet.

    Evidence behind this scenario

    With Saksi. The regulator reads the same sealed records. Agencies with a tampered record or a late breach notice are flagged before anyone visits.

    Try it as the regulator

Indonesia keeps leaking personal data. Nobody outside can check the logs.

  • Records on the dark web · 2024

    56.1M

    56,128,160 Indonesian records from 461 organisations; 58.34% came from government administration.

  • Tenants hit at once · 2024

    282

    Government tenants hit by one ransomware attack on the National Data Centre (PDNS 2) in June 2024.

  • Leaked accounts · H1 2026

    1.22M

    The most of any of 11 Southeast Asian countries in the first half of 2026.

  • Say their data leaked · 2021

    28.7%

    3,246 of 11,305 people in a national Kominfo survey. They rated data protection 6.05 out of 10.

The evidence stays inside. So does the doubt.

When taxpayer (NPWP) data was alleged to have leaked in 2024, the tax office answered with six years of its own access logs. It may well have been right. But no citizen, journalist or regulator could check that answer, because the only copy of the evidence belonged to the party being asked.

The checkers are stretched. Komdigi’s own sampling found potential violations on 41% of the websites it checked, OJK received 56,620 consumer complaints in 2025, and the agency UU PDP created to enforce the law had not been formed by November 2026.

Estonia has shown citizens who looked at their data in government registers, and why, since 2017. Saksi brings that idea to private companies, with proofs anyone can verify instead of logs held by one party.

“data log access dalam enam tahun terakhir menunjukkan tidak adanya indikasi yang mengarah kepada kebocoran data langsung”
“Access-log data from the last six years shows no indication of a direct data leak.” DJP spokesperson, 20 Sep 2024.

Who checks the agencies

Websites with potential violations
115 / 280 · 41%
Apps with potential violations
24 / 70 · 34%
Suspected UU PDP cases
56
OJK consumer complaints · 2025
56,620
From fintech · banking
21,886 · 20,972
UU PDP agency
Not formed · Nov 2026

The law already asks for the record. Saksi makes it checkable.

  1. UU PDP Art. 31

    Record every processing of personal data.

    Access receipt

    Each access becomes a record whose fingerprint is sealed on Sepolia. The citizen’s phone recomputes it against the chain.

    Try it as the citizen
  2. UU PDP Art. 20(2)

    Process only on one of six legal bases, a to f.

    Legal basis on every receipt

    The controller picks the basis it claims (PDP-20-2-a to f) and it is sealed with the record, so it cannot be swapped later.

    Try it as the agency
  3. UU PDP Art. 46

    Notify data subjects and the authority within 3 × 24 hours.

    72-hour contract clock

    BreachReport compares the block time with the declared discovery time. After 72 hours an on-time notice is refused and can only be recorded as late.

    Try it as the regulator
  4. UU PDP Art. 46

    Say which data was exposed, when and how, and what is being done.

    AI notice draft

    The AI drafts those three parts from the controller’s narrative; the controller edits and seals it. On time or late is decided by the contract, never the AI.

    Draft a notice as the agency
  5. Oversight

    Someone outside the company has to check the record.

    Regulator register

    Compares each database row with its chain event and flags records that match, were changed after sealing, were deleted, or were never sealed, without asking the agency for access.

    Open the regulator workspace
  6. POJK 40/2024 Art. 161–162

    Non-repudiation when personal data is accessed; an audit trail for supervision and disputes.

    Signed, public proof

    Each record is sent from the controller’s registered wallet, and anyone can check a receipt in the public verifier, in the browser.

    Public verifier
  7. UU PDP Art. 57 · POJK 22/2023

    Fines up to 2% of annual revenue; in finance, up to Rp15 billion per violation.

    Why a controller adopts it

    Compliance it can prove to a citizen, an auditor or a court, instead of a log only it can read.

Sources. Opened and read.

Each quote is the passage a figure comes from, in the source’s language. Notes say where a figure is narrower than it looks.

  1. 01

    In 2024 alone, BSSN counted more than 56 million Indonesian data records from 461 organisations exposed on the dark web, with government administration making up 58% of the leaked data.

    56,128,160 records; 461 stakeholders; 58.34% government administration (2024)

    “mencatat 56.128.160 data dari 461 pemangku kepentingan di Indonesia terekspos ke dark web ... Mayoritas data yang bocor didominasi sektor administrasi pemerintahan (58,34%)”

    Note: Media report quoting the BSSN annual report; the BSSN PDF itself was not opened.

    Data Pemerintah Dominasi 58 Persen Kebocoran di Dark Web, Platform Baru Ini Tawarkan Deteksi Dini · Liputan6.com, citing BSSN, Lanskap Keamanan Siber Indonesia 2024 · 10 Oct 2025
  2. 02

    The June 2024 Brain Cipher ransomware attack on the National Data Centre (PDNS 2) hit 282 government tenants at once: one operator holding everyone’s records is a single point of failure.

    282 tenants affected

    “Setelah terjadi gangguan di PDNS 2 Surabaya akibat serangan Ransomware Brain Cipher, terdapat 282 tenant yang terdampak.”
    PDNS 2 Diserang Hacker, 3 Layanan Pulih dari Total 282 Korban · CNN Indonesia, quoting Herlan Wijanarko, Telkom Indonesia · 26 Jun 2024
  3. 03

    Indonesia had more leaked accounts than any other Southeast Asian country in the first half of 2026: 1.22 million.

    1.22 million accounts in H1 2026 (Q1 915,746; Q2 300,416); first of 11 Southeast Asian countries

    “Indonesia: 1,22 juta akun (Q1 915.746; Q2 300.416), first among 11 Southeast Asian countries; Philippines second with 841.122”

    Note: The quote summarises the chart rather than copying a sentence. Surfshark notes that 25.8% of leaked accounts carry no country, so national counts may be low.

    Kebocoran Data Indonesia Terbanyak di Asia Tenggara Semester I 2026 · Databoks / Katadata (data: Surfshark) · 3 Aug 2026
  4. 04

    When NPWP taxpayer data was alleged to have leaked in 2024, the tax authority denied it by citing six years of its own access logs: evidence no outsider could check.

    Denial based on six years of internal access logs

    “data log access dalam enam tahun terakhir menunjukkan tidak adanya indikasi yang mengarah kepada kebocoran data langsung”

    Note: The size of the alleged leak is the attacker’s claim and is not repeated here.

    Ditjen Pajak Tegaskan Tidak Ada Indikasi Kebocoran NPWP! · CNBC Indonesia, quoting DJP spokesperson Dwi Astuti · 20 Sep 2024
  5. 05

    Komdigi’s own monitoring found likely personal-data violations on 41% of the websites and 34% of the apps it sampled, and logged 342 complaints and 56 suspected UU PDP violation cases in about a year.

    342 complaints; 483 consultations; 56 suspected violation cases; 115 of 280 websites (41%) and 24 of 70 apps (34%) with potential violations (Oct 2024 to Nov 2025)

    “Pengelolaan data pribadi pada layanan berbasis website masih menjadi titik rawan”
    Komdigi Terima Ratusan Aduan soal Perlindungan Data Pribadi · detikInet, written statement by Alexander Sabar, Komdigi · 28 Dec 2025
  6. 06

    OJK received 56,620 consumer complaints in 2025, led by fintech (21,886) and banking (20,972): the sectors that most need dispute evidence both sides can trust.

    56,620 complaints (1 Jan to 28 Dec 2025); fintech 21,886; banking 20,972

    “56.620 pengaduan, sejak 1 Januari 2025 hingga 28 Desember 2025 ... 21.886 berasal dari industri financial technology ... sebanyak 20.972 berasal dari industri perbankan”
    OJK Terima 56.620 Pengaduan Konsumen Sepanjang 2025, Pinjol Ilegal Dominan · Kontan · 9 Jan 2026
  7. 07

    UU PDP Article 31 already requires every data controller to record all personal-data processing. Saksi makes that record something outsiders can verify.

    Art. 31: mandatory recording of all processing activities

    “Pengendali Data Pribadi wajib melakukan perekaman terhadap seluruh kegiatan pemrosesan Data Pribadi.”
    UU No. 27 Tahun 2022 tentang Pelindungan Data Pribadi, Pasal 31 · Pasal.id (text of UU 27/2022) · 17 Oct 2022
  8. 08

    UU PDP Article 46 requires a written breach notice to both the data subjects and the authority within 3 × 24 hours, stating which data was exposed, when and how, and what remediation is underway.

    3 × 24 hours; notify the data subject and the authority; three mandatory contents

    “paling lambat 3 x 24 (tiga kali dua puluh empat) jam kepada: a. Subjek Data Pribadi; dan b. lembaga.”
    UU No. 27 Tahun 2022 tentang Pelindungan Data Pribadi, Pasal 46 · Pasal.id (text of UU 27/2022) · 17 Oct 2022
  9. 09

    UU PDP Article 20(2) lists exactly six lawful bases for processing (consent, contract, legal obligation, vital interest, public task, legitimate interest), and every Saksi receipt records which one the controller claims.

    Six legal bases, letters a to f

    “a. persetujuan yang sah secara eksplisit dari Subjek Data Pribadi ... f. pemenuhan kepentingan yang sah lainnya”
    UU No. 27 Tahun 2022 tentang Pelindungan Data Pribadi, Pasal 20 · Pasal.id (text of UU 27/2022) · 17 Oct 2022
  10. 10

    Breaching UU PDP obligations can lead to an administrative fine of up to 2% of annual revenue, plus written warnings, suspension of processing, or deletion of data.

    Up to 2% of annual revenue or receipts

    “paling tinggi 2 (dua) persen dari pendapatan tahunan atau penerimaan tahunan terhadap variabel pelanggaran”
    UU No. 27 Tahun 2022 tentang Pelindungan Data Pribadi, Pasal 57 · Pasal.id (text of UU 27/2022) · 17 Oct 2022
  11. 11

    OJK’s P2P-lending rule (POJK 40/2024) requires non-repudiation when personal data is accessed, a complete audit trail usable for supervision and dispute resolution, and written notice to data owners after a breach.

    Art. 161(1)(b) non-repudiation; Art. 161(1)(d) written breach notice; Art. 162(1),(3) audit trail for supervision, enforcement, dispute resolution and verification

    “memastikan tersedianya proses autentikasi, verifikasi, dan validasi yang mendukung kenirsangkalan dalam mengakses, memproses, dan mengeksekusi Data Pribadi; Pasal 162(1): Penyelenggara wajib menyediakan rekam jejak audit terhadap seluruh kegiatannya di dalam Sistem Elektronik.”

    Note: Read from the official PDF. The administrative fine in that chapter is capped at Rp50 million.

    Peraturan OJK Nomor 40 Tahun 2024 tentang Layanan Pendanaan Bersama Berbasis Teknologi Informasi · Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (via peraturan.go.id) · 24 Dec 2024
  12. 12

    POJK 22/2023 bars financial institutions from giving consumer data to other parties without a UU PDP legal basis, requires them to give consumers a copy of their data, and fines violations up to Rp15 billion each.

    Up to Rp15,000,000,000 per violation (Art. 19(8), Art. 22(5))

    “Pasal 22(1): PUJK dilarang: a. memberikan data dan/atau informasi mengenai Konsumen kepada pihak lain; Pasal 19(8): paling banyak Rp15.000.000.000,00 (lima belas miliar rupiah).”

    Note: Art. 23(1) exempts institutions that have a lawful processing basis.

    POJK 22 Tahun 2023 tentang Pelindungan Konsumen dan Masyarakat di Sektor Jasa Keuangan · Otoritas Jasa Keuangan · Dec 2023
  13. 13

    Indonesia’s UU PDP enforcement agency still did not exist in November 2026: the draft Presidential Regulation went to the President on 20 May 2026 and was still pending.

    Draft Perpres submitted 20 May 2026; agency not yet formed as of 5 Nov 2026

    “Pemerintah jangan menunda-nunda pembentukan Badan Pelindungan Data Pribadi.”

    Note: The article reports the 20 May 2026 submission and implies, without one explicit sentence, that the agency is not yet formed.

    Kasus Penyadapan dan Urgensi Pembentukan Badan Pelindungan Data Pribadi · Kompas.com · 5 Nov 2026
  14. 14

    Estonia has let citizens see who looked at their data in government registers, and why, since 2017 (the Data Tracker on eesti.ee).

    Since 2017; government registers only

    “Since 2017, the tool gives citizens the possibility ... always keep an eye on who is accessing their data, and for what reasons.”

    Note: Limited to government registers, and the logs are held by the state.

    Data Tracker – tool that builds trust in institutions · e-Estonia · 18 Sep 2019
  15. 15

    In a Kominfo national survey of 11,305 people, 28.7% (3,246) said their personal data had already leaked, and respondents rated Indonesia’s data protection 6.05 out of 10.

    11,305 respondents in 34 provinces, 14–21 July 2021; 3,246 reported leaks (28.7%); protection score 6.05/10

    “Responden yang melaporkan pernah mengalami kebocoran data pribadi berasal dari 34 provinsi di Indonesia, total berjumlah 3.246 orang ... skor rata-rata 6,05 dari skala 10.”

    Note: 28.7% is computed as 3,246 / 11,305. The survey predates UU PDP (2022).

    Persepsi Masyarakat atas Pelindungan Data Pribadi – Survei Nasional Tahun 2021 · Kementerian Kominfo & Katadata Insight Center · 2021
  16. 16

    UU PDP Article 32 gives every data subject the right to see their data together with its processing record, within 3 × 24 hours of asking. A Saksi receipt delivers that record without the citizen having to ask.

    Access to data "beserta rekam jejak pemrosesan"; within 3 × 24 hours of the request

    “Pengendali Data Pribadi wajib memberikan akses kepada Subjek Data Pribadi terhadap Data Pribadi yang diproses beserta rekam jejak pemrosesan Data Pribadi ... paling lambat 3 x 24 (tiga kali dua puluh empat) jam terhitung sejak Pengendali Data Pribadi menerima permintaan akses.”
    UU No. 27 Tahun 2022 tentang Pelindungan Data Pribadi, Pasal 32 · Pasal.id (text of UU 27/2022) · 17 Oct 2022
  17. 17

    UU PDP’s implementing regulation, PP 33/2026, was signed on 16 July 2026 and takes effect on 16 January 2027.

    Signed 16 Jul 2026; in force 16 Jan 2027

    “Aturan ini berlaku enam bulan sejak diundangkan atau pada 16 Januari 2027.”

    Note: Press report; the official PP text was not opened.

    PP Pelindungan Data Pribadi Berlaku Januari 2027, Ini Aturan Baru Data Anak · Katadata · 3 Sep 2026
  18. 18

    As of 4 November 2026, the Presidential Regulation creating the PDP agency had only been submitted to the President; Komdigi carries out the agency’s functions until it exists.

    Draft Perpres submitted via the State Secretariat; agency not yet formed (4 Nov 2026)

    “Sudah diajukan kepada Presiden melalui Kementerian Sekretariat Negara”
    Komdigi: Perpres Lembaga Pengawas PDP Masuk Tahap Final · Katadata, quoting Muchtarul Huda, Komdigi · 5 Nov 2026
  19. 19

    7,833 institutions had agreements with Dukcapil to use population data as of November 2026, verifying citizens’ identity against the national NIK database.

    7,833 institutions (as of 3 Nov 2026)

    “Sampai November tahun ini, sudah 7.833 lembaga bekerja sama.”

    Note: The figure is the outlet’s narration of Kemendagri data, not a direct quote from an official.

    Kemendagri Perluas Jangkauan IKD, 7.833 Lembaga Sudah Kerja Sama · JawaPos, citing Kemendagri data · 10 Nov 2026
  20. 20

    By the end of 2025, institutions had queried Dukcapil’s population data 18.94 billion times; 2,283 active users made 2.57 billion queries in 2025 alone.

    7,419 institutions and 18.94 billion hits cumulative; 2,283 active users and 2.57 billion hits in 2025

    “Hingga 31 Desember 2025, tercatat ada 2.283 lembaga pengguna aktif, melampaui target nasional yang dipatok 1.300 lembaga ... Jumlah tersebut terdiri atas 1.218 lembaga pusat dan 1.065 lembaga daerah dengan total akses mencapai 2,57 miliar hits. ... sebanyak 7.419 lembaga telah memanfaatkan layanan data kependudukan dengan total akses menyentuh 18,94 miliar hits.”

    Note: Secondary outlet; the official Dukcapil release was not found.

    Kinerja Ditjen Dukcapil Tahun 2025 Lampaui Target · RMOL, reporting Dirjen Dukcapil Teguh Setyabudi at Rakornas Dukcapil 2026 · 3 Aug 2026
  21. 21

    Dukcapil can see which institution looked up which citizen, but citizens have no matching view. The record exists; only the controller can read it.

    Access is password-based and visible to Dukcapil (2019)

    “Yang mengakses itu ada passwordnya kan, kita tahu siapa sedang mengambil data siapa”

    Note: Dates from 2019. "No citizen view" means we found no public channel, not that one is officially ruled out.

    Hanya Akses Verifikasi, Ombudsman Anggap Sistem Pemanfaatan Data Kependudukan Aman · Ombudsman RI, quoting Dirjen Dukcapil Zudan Arif Fakrulloh · 25 Jul 2019
  22. 22

    When 204 million voter records were alleged to have leaked in 2023, Kominfo had to send the election commission a second letter citing UU PDP’s three-day rule, and still had no answer.

    Second letter sent; no clarification after about a week (5 Dec 2023)

    “Ini yang kami tunggu, kami lagi mengirim surat kedua, KPU wajib membalas ... sesuai aturan dari Undang-Undang PDP harusnya KPU memberi kabar tiga hari.”

    Note: The leak itself was never confirmed. UU PDP’s transition period ran until October 2024.

    204 Juta Data Pemilih Diduga Bocor, Kominfo: KPU Belum Klarifikasi · detikInet, quoting Semuel A. Pangerapan, Kominfo · 5 Dec 2023
  23. 23

    When 337 million population records were alleged to have leaked in 2023, Dukcapil disputed it by saying the data’s format did not match its database. Outsiders had no way to check.

    Denial based on a data-format mismatch; audit with BSSN still in progress

    “data yang ada di Breachforums dilihat dari format elemen datanya tidak sama dengan yang terdapat di database kependudukan”
    Dirjen Dukcapil: Format data diduga bocor berbeda dengan database · ANTARA, quoting Dirjen Dukcapil Teguh Setyabudi · 17 Jul 2023
  24. 24

    After the 2024 PDNS ransomware attack, the head of BSSN told Parliament that only about 2% of the data had been backed up and that the root problem was governance.

    About 2% of PDNS 2 data backed up

    “hanya sekitar 2 persen data dari PDNS 2 yang sudah tercadangkan”
    Akui Data tak Selamat Usai Diserang Hacker, BSSN Ungkap PDNS tak Punya Back Up · Republika, quoting BSSN head Hinsa Siburian at DPR Komisi I · 27 Jun 2024
  25. 25

    Every electronic system operator in Indonesia, government agencies included, must already keep an audit trail of all system activity for supervision, dispute resolution and verification (PP 71/2019 Article 22).

    Art. 22(1)–(2); Art. 2(3) puts government "Instansi" in scope

    “Penyelenggara Sistem Elektronik wajib menyediakan rekam jejak audit terhadap seluruh kegiatan penyelenggaraan Sistem Elektronik. ... digunakan untuk keperluan pengawasan, penegakan hukum, penyelesaian sengketa, verifikasi, pengujian, dan pemeriksaan lainnya.”
    PP No. 71 Tahun 2019 tentang Penyelenggaraan Sistem dan Transaksi Elektronik, Pasal 22 · Pemerintah RI (via peraturan.go.id) · 4 Oct 2019
  26. 26

    Banks must already keep an IT audit trail for supervision, dispute resolution and verification, and notify OJK within 24 hours of a significant IT incident (POJK 11/2022 Articles 54 and 60).

    Art. 54(2) audit trail; Art. 60(1) initial notice within 24 hours, full report within 5 working days

    “Bank wajib memastikan ketersediaan jejak audit atas seluruh kegiatan penyelenggaraan TI untuk keperluan pengawasan, penegakan hukum, penyelesaian sengketa, verifikasi, pengujian, dan pemeriksaan lain.”
    POJK Nomor 11/POJK.03/2022 tentang Penyelenggaraan Teknologi Informasi oleh Bank Umum · Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (via peraturan.go.id) · 6 Jul 2022
  27. 27

    Government (SPBE) web applications must already protect their logs from unauthorised access and modification (Peraturan BSSN 4/2021 Article 27(6)(e)). Saksi makes that protection checkable.

    Art. 27(6)(d) log scope for investigations; (e) protection against unauthorised modification; (g) time sync

    “mengatur pelindungan log aplikasi dari akses dan modifikasi yang tidak sah”
    Peraturan BSSN Nomor 4 Tahun 2021 tentang Pedoman Manajemen Keamanan Informasi SPBE dan Standar Teknis dan Prosedur Keamanan SPBE · Badan Siber dan Sandi Negara (via peraturan.go.id) · 19 May 2021
  28. 28

    Even Estonia’s Data Tracker showed citizens queries from only 16 of the country’s hundreds of databases in 2025, and the state holds the logs.

    16 databases (Aug 2025); "hundreds" in total

    “Praegu näeb enda kohta päritud andmete kohta infot andmejälgijas vaid 16 andmekogust. ... Kokku on neid sadu.”

    Note: The publication date was decoded from the page timestamp.

    Andmejälgija infot näeb vaid 16 andmekogu kohta · ERR (Estonian Public Broadcasting) · 12 Aug 2025
  29. 29

    Georgia’s public land registry anchors a hash of each land transaction on the Bitcoin public chain while the records stay with the registry: a government precedent for Saksi’s design.

    Transaction hash ("digital receipt") anchored to Bitcoin

    “uploads an immutable hash, or digital receipt, of a land transaction to the Bitcoin blockchain”

    Note: Whether the system is still operating in 2026 was not confirmed.

    Project Capsule: Georgia Land Titling System · New America · 15 Dec 2020
  30. 30

    In APJII’s 2026 national survey, 21.4% of Indonesians said they had never done anything to protect their personal data, and only 25.9% applied basic protection.

    n = 8,700, 38 provinces, 1 Feb – 15 Mar 2026, ±1.1%; 21.4% none; 25.9% basic protection

    “21,4 persen responden mengaku sama sekali tidak tahu atau bahkan tidak pernah melakukan upaya apa pun”

    Note: Press report of the APJII survey; the report itself was not opened.

    Survei APJII: Kasus Kejahatan Siber di Indonesia Menurun · Metro TV News (data: APJII, Survei Internet Indonesia 2026) · 22 May 2026
  31. 31

    In a 2021 CfDS UGM survey of 2,401 people, 78.7% were very worried that companies, the government or third parties would misuse their personal data.

    n = 2,401, 34 provinces, 21 Oct – 1 Nov 2021; 78.7% very worried

    “78,7% responden sangat khawatir data pribadi mereka disalahgunakan oleh perusahaan, pemerintah, maupun pihak ketiga”

    Note: The quote is the page’s figure as summarised by the fetch tool, not a single copied sentence. Predates UU PDP; online sample.

    Survei CfDS UGM: Masih Sedikit Masyarakat yang Mafhum Data Pribadi · Universitas Gadjah Mada (CfDS FISIPOL) · 2 Dec 2021
  32. 32

    UU PDP Article 12 gives every data subject the right to sue and receive compensation when their personal data is processed in violation of the law. A sealed record is evidence for that claim.

    Art. 12(1): right to sue and receive compensation; Art. 12(2): details by Government Regulation

    “Subjek Data Pribadi berhak menggugat dan menerima ganti rugi atas pelanggaran pemrosesan Data Pribadi tentang dirinya sesuai dengan ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan.”
    UU No. 27 Tahun 2022 tentang Pelindungan Data Pribadi, Pasal 12 · Pasal.id (text of UU 27/2022) · 17 Oct 2022