Who opened your data?Now there’s a witness.
Every time a company touches your data, Saksi seals a fingerprint of that record on a public chain. Your phone can check it, so nobody, not even an insider, can quietly rewrite the story.
- Hash only on chain
- No wallet for citizens
- Sample tx
0xc3073600…8a259a11
The problem
Your access log lives in the company’s own database. Any insider can edit a row. You would never know.
- 21 NOV 09:12 · R.0408
- READ · OPS-12
- 21 NOV 10:47 · R.0409
- UPDATE · OPS-03
- 21 NOV 11:30 · R.0410
- READ · CS-07
- 21 NOV 13:58 · R.0411
- EXPORT · RISK-02
- 21 NOV 14:03 · R.0412
- OPENED YOUR FILE
- WHO
- Contoh Lending Co.
- DID
- SHARED WITH THIRD PARTYREAD
- WHY
- Debt collection
- BASIS
- Legitimate interest
- FINGERPRINT
- none · database only
WASSHARED WITH THIRD PARTY
Nobody but the insider saw that.
- Dark web · 2024
- 56,128,160 records exposed
- Tax office · 2024
- Denied a leak with own logs
- RECORD: A company opens your file. It has to write down who opened it, what they did and why.
- SEAL: Only a fingerprint goes on chain. Your data stays on their server. The chain gets a hash, sealed by the company’s registered wallet.
- VERIFY: Your phone recomputes it. Same fingerprint as the chain. Match. Checked in your browser, not on our server.
- EDIT: An insider rewrites the log. One field, quietly, straight in the database. Nobody touches the chain.
- ALTERED: Your phone flags it. The chain still holds the original fingerprint. The edited record no longer matches it.
One record.
One fingerprint. Checked by you.
Edit the database.
The chain remembers.
A company opens your file.
It has to write down who opened it, what they did and why.
Only a fingerprint goes on chain.
Your data stays on their server. The chain gets a hash, sealed by the company’s registered wallet.
Your phone recomputes it.
Same fingerprint as the chain. Match. Checked in your browser, not on our server.
An insider rewrites the log.
One field, quietly, straight in the database. Nobody touches the chain.
Your phone flags it.
The chain still holds the original fingerprint. The edited record no longer matches it.
One record. One fingerprint. Checked by you.
A company opens your file.
It has to write down who opened it, what they did and why.
- WHOContoh Lending Co.
- DIDSHARED WITH THIRD PARTY
- WHYDebt collection
Only a fingerprint goes on chain.
Your data stays on their server. The chain gets a hash, sealed by the company’s registered wallet.
- FINGERPRINT0xc307…9a11
- BLOCK#12,181,964
- SEALED21 Nov 19:54 WIB
Your phone recomputes it.
Same fingerprint as the chain. Match. Checked in your browser, not on our server.
- VERIFIEDBy your phone
- MATCHIn seconds
Edit the database. The chain remembers.
An insider rewrites the log.
One field, quietly, straight in the database. Nobody touches the chain.
Your phone flags it.
The chain still holds the original fingerprint. The edited record no longer matches it.
- ALTEREDDID changed
- SEALED0xc307…9a11
- DATABASE COPY0x7be0…41a6
A breach starts a clock. The chain keeps the time.
UU PDP Art. 46 gives a company 72 hours to report a breach. The notice is sealed with its own block time, and the contract compares it with the declared discovery time.
Sealed at 53.5 H of 72 H · 18.5 H to spare · computed by the contract
One record. Three people who can check it.
- See every access.01 · CitizenGet a receipt seconds after a company opens your data, and verify it on your phone. No wallet, no login.Enter as a citizen
- Prove you complied.02 · AgencySeal each access and each breach notice from your registered wallet. Compliance anyone can check.Enter as an agency
- Audit without asking.03 · RegulatorSee on-time and late breach notices and every altered row, read straight from the chain.Enter as the regulator
Don’t trust us. Check it yourself.
Paste a fingerprint or a transaction, or scan a receipt QR. Your browser reads the chain from a public node and recomputes the fingerprint itself. Switch the node, read the raw log, open it on the block explorer.
0xc3073600aa64…14e08a259a11Checking the chain…
0.0s
Checked by your browser · not by our server
A real receipt sealed on Sepolia (synthetic data). Open this receipt
Saksi proves
- The record has not been changed since it was sealed.
- When the chain received it: the chain clock, not the company’s.
- Which registered company wallet sealed it.
- Whether a breach notice was sealed inside 72 hours.
Saksi does not prove
- That every access was recorded, only the ones logged.
- That the access was lawful or the stated reason is true.
- The real discovery time of a breach.
- That notifications were actually sent to people.
Questions people ask. Short answers.
Three people. A company (the controller) records each access from its registered wallet. A citizen gets a receipt and checks it on their phone. A regulator sees on-time or late breach notices and altered rows, without asking the company for access.
Checking is reading, and reading a public chain is free. Your phone asks a public RPC node and recomputes the fingerprint itself. Only the company signs, because only the company makes claims.
A normal log lives in the company’s own database, so whoever can write to it can rewrite it. Saksi seals a fingerprint of each entry on a public chain the moment it is written. If someone changes the row later, the fingerprint no longer matches.
Yes. UU PDP Art. 31 requires every controller to record all processing of personal data, and OJK’s lending rule (POJK 40/2024) asks for non-repudiation and an audit trail usable in disputes. Both leave the log inside the company. Saksi makes that same record checkable by the person it is about.
It does not prove that the access was lawful, that the stated reason is true, or that every access was recorded. It proves three things: the record has not changed since it was sealed, when it was sealed, and which registered wallet sealed it.
A fingerprint of the record and a keyed pseudonym (HMAC) in place of your identity, plus a salted hash of the purpose, the access type, the legal-basis code and the time. No names, no ID numbers, no record contents. The readable details stay on the company’s server.
The company (the controller) signs every record in its own wallet, so it pays the gas: one small transaction per access. Saksi’s server never holds a key and pays nothing. Saksi runs on the Sepolia testnet, where gas costs no real money. Batching many records into one transaction (Merkle) and moving to an L2 are on the roadmap, not built.
Then there is no receipt, and Saksi cannot invent one. We state that limit openly. What Saksi does is make recorded history impossible to quietly rewrite. The same goes for breach notices: the contract only judges notices that are sealed, as on time or late. A notice that is never sent leaves no record at all, so the regulator has to catch it from citizen reports or an audit.
The breach notice is sealed with its own block time. The contract compares that time with the declared discovery time. On time or late is computed by code, not claimed in a PDF.
Saksi uses synthetic data only for now. A public testnet gives judges real, checkable transactions without anyone spending real money. The contracts and the in-browser verifier are ordinary EVM code; moving to mainnet or an L2 is a roadmap step we have not taken.
It explains a receipt in plain language and drafts the Art. 46 breach notice. It never decides. MATCH, ALTERED, on time and late are always computed by code and the contract, and every AI output is labelled with its model.